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HERMENEUTICAL INJUSTICE: BLOOD-SPORTS AND THE ENGLISH DEFENCE 
LEAGUE 
Introduction 
Each culture possesses shared meanings that its members can use to make sense of their 
experience and communicate it to others. Cultures are not monolithic, but are made up of 
different social groups. Where there are uneven power relations between these groups, the 
cultureÕs shared meanings often predominately reflect the experiences of the more powerful. 
Where the experiences of a less powerful group differ, the shared meanings of the culture will 
be a poor fit, and consequently, members of that group may suffer disadvantage. Fricker 
(2008) takes such disadvantage to constitute what she calls Ôhermeneutical injusticeÕ. I argue 
here that her account faces a serious difficulty: it relies on two intuitions about the source of 
hermeneutical injustice that are in tension with one another, and which cannot be made 
consistent within FrickerÕs framework. As a result, her account is both too restrictive (it fails 
to capture all the cases we intuitively think it should), and too permissive (it classifies cases 
as instances of hermeneutical injustice that we think it should not).  
 
Hermeneutical injustice 
Fricker presents four, what she takes to be paradigmatic, examples of hermeneutical injustice. 
It will be useful to begin by considering these cases. 
The first is Wendy Sanford, who, in the late sixties, attended a consciousness-raising 
session where she learnt for the first time about postnatal depression. ÔIn that one forty-five 
minute period I realized that what IÕd been blaming myself for, and what my husband had 
blamed me for, wasnÕt my personal deficiency. It was a combination of physiological things 
and a real societal thing, isolationÕ (Brownmiller 1990: 182). The second is Carmita Wood, 
who in the mid-seventies, worked as an administrator in CornellÕs department of nuclear 
physics. Wood was sexually harassed by a professor in the department, the stress of which, 
made her ill. She was eventually driven out of her job. Both her application for a transfer to a 
different department, and then unemployment benefit were turned down, as she could not 
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explain her situation. ÔWhen the claims investigator asked why she had left her job after eight 
years, Wood was at a loss to describe the hateful episodes. She was ashamed and 
embarrassedÉ Her claim for unemployment benefits was deniedÕ (Brownmiller 1990: 281). 
The third is drawn from Ian McEwanÕs novel Enduring Love, which tells the story of Joe who 
is stalked by a delusional religious man called Jed Parry. Joe is unable to communicate the 
seriousness of the situation to either his partner Clarissa, or the police, whom he contacts for 
help. ÔThe voice cut in, impatience taking hold at last. ÒIÕm sorry caller. This is not a police 
matter. Unless he harms you, or your property, or threatens the same heÕs committing no 
offence. Trying to convert you is not against the law.ÓÕ (McEwan 1998: 74). The fourth is 
taken from Edmund WhiteÕs semi-autobiographical novel, A BoyÕs Own Story, which tells the 
story of growing up as a homosexual man in 1950Õs USA (whilst the novelÕs protagonist is 
unnamed, I will, for ease of reference, refer to him for the rest of this paper as Edmund 
White). White thinks of homosexuality as a sickness, and associates various negative 
stereotypes with it, which affect how he sees himself. ÔI see now that what I wanted was to be 
loved by men and to love them back, but not to be a homosexualÉWhat I required was a 
sleight of hand, an alibi or a convincing act of bad faith to persuade myself I was not that 
vampireÕ (White 1998: 70).  
These examples make clear that FrickerÕs talk of ÔexperienceÕ does not refer to some 
inner content before the subjectÕs mind, but to her perspective on the world, the events and 
activities of her life as she lives through them, and/or feelings and reactions she has that are 
bound up with these things. It also includes her conception of herself Ð her self-identity. 
Notice also that the concepts required to capture oneÕs experience will have an evaluative 
dimension to them. By this, I mean that they not only describe what one might roughly think 
of as the first-order phenomenology of the subjectÕs experience, but they also assign the 
experience a particular place in the grand scheme of things, and its place makes certain 
valuations of the experience and the subject who undergoes it appropriate or inappropriate. 
For example, the concept Ôpost-natal depressionÕ not only labels feelings of being unable to 
cope, irritability, mood changes, and so on, after the birth of oneÕs child. It also classifies 
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these feelings as a known medical condition. As such, it is inappropriate to think of those 
feelings as an idiosyncratic personal failing for which their subject is blameworthy. Instead, it 
is appropriate to hold that she requires support from her loved ones and medical assistance. 
Whilst I have distinguished between an experienceÕs first-order phenomenology and its place 
in the grand scheme of things, it is likely that in many Ð perhaps all Ð cases, these will inform 
each other. Obviously, the phenomenology of oneÕs experience partly determines what sort of 
experience it is and so what place it has in the grand scheme of things, but the place it is 
assigned can also affect the phenomenology. For example, the feelings associated with post-
natal depression will be different when they are compounded with guilt from thinking that 
one is blameworthy. 
The cases illustrate the three central negative effects that may result from a lack of 
shared meanings or hermeneutical resources, according to FrickerÕs analysis. Any instance of 
hermeneutical injustice will involve one or more of these effects. First, the agent may be 
unable to fully understand her own experience. In Wendy SanfordÕs case, she took her 
persistent low mood, irritability, feelings of despair, and so on to be an idiosyncratic personal 
failing, rather than a medical condition that other women also faced. Carmita Wood was 
unable to properly recognise the wrongs done to her by the professor. Edmund White found it 
hard to understand his experience as a non-pathological and non-perverse form of human 
sexuality. Second, the agent may be unable to properly communicate her experience to others. 
Wendy SanfordÕs husband blames her for her postnatal depression because he too is unable to 
recognise it as a medical condition for which she needs help and support. Carmita Wood is 
unable to properly explain why she wishes to move departments or why she left work. 
Edmund White cannot communicate his feelings to others without being judged sick or 
perverted. Whilst Joe can arguably understand his experience of being stalked Ð he 
understands that the behaviour of the perpetrator is threatening, unacceptable, and a matter for 
the police to tackle Ð he cannot communicate this to others. Third, Fricker holds that the lack 
of appropriate hermeneutical resources may negatively impact the agentÕs construction of his 
identity. She takes the Edmund White case to illustrate this point. The suggestion is 
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seemingly that the terms in which White is able to understand his sexuality are such that they 
pervade his sense of who and what he is Ð an ill pervert. In contrast, Wendy Sanford blames 
herself for failing to feel as she believes one should towards oneÕs baby. Moreover, she may 
judge that she is a bad person in this respect. Yet this judgement does not fundamentally alter 
who and what she takes herself to be. It may be that there is no clear line between cases where 
the subject simply fails to understand her experience, and those where this failure has a 
negative impact on the construction of her identity. I take it that this is not a problem for 
Fricker, since it is plausible to think that failures in understanding come in degrees. 
Fricker is often interpreted as holding that victims of hermeneutical injustice are 
always unable to understand their own experience. Indeed, this is how she often presents the 
matter. However, I do not think this interpretation is correct. The gap in the hermeneutical 
resources may sometimes have this effect, but as the case of Joe illustrates, sometimes the 
victim may perfectly understand her own experience, but be unable to communicate it to 
others. Thus I read Fricker as claiming that hermeneutical injustice may involve a lack of self-
understanding, but that this is not a necessary feature of the phenomenon. In some cases, it is 
not the culture in general that lacks the appropriate meanings, but the dominant social 
group(s). Mason (2011) argues that it is important that FrickerÕs analysis allows the primary 
effect to be an inability to communicate, since many intuitive cases of hermeneutical injustice 
are of this sort. Mason argues that Carmita Wood was actually in this position Ð contrary to 
what Fricker claims, she understood the wrongs done to her. The obstacle she faced was 
communicating her experience to the dominant social group(s). 
For Fricker, the lack of appropriate shared meanings must concern some significant 
aspect of the subject's experience. This is required for the hermeneutical lack to sufficiently 
disadvantage the subject, and so be the sort of thing that could potentially be classed as an 
injustice. A minor annoyance would not count as such. It is also important that the lack of 
appropriate shared meanings results from an uneven distribution of power. It is generally 
accepted that some of the ills that befall a person will not count as injustice, but be merely a 
matter of bad luck. Fricker contends that this may be so in the hermeneutic case too. For 
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example, someone who suffers from an unknown illness will not receive appropriate medical 
treatment. Their friends and family may not recognise that they are ill as no diagnosis can be 
given. Fricker contends that whilst someone in this position is significantly harmed by the 
hermeneutical gap, they do not suffer from injustice because the lack of appropriate meanings 
does not result from uneven distributions of power. Instead, the person is unlucky.  
Fricker holds that the sort of power that is important in the current context is 
hermeneutical power. Certain social groups have better access to the production of shared 
meanings than others, and as such, they have greater hermeneutical power. First, certain 
careers afford greater hermeneutical power. Journalists, for example, often have a large 
amount of control over their culture's hermeneutical resources. 'Immigrant' now has pejorative 
connotations in the UK Ð one can barely hear the word without inserting 'illegal' before it Ð 
due in part, to a sustained campaign against immigration carried out by some sections of the 
UK media. Legislators also have a lot of control over their culture's shared meanings. The 
introduction of the notion of sexual harassment into law helped bring about widespread 
cultural acceptance of such behaviour as wrong. Other careers also afford a large amount of 
hermeneutical power. In contrast, cleaners have little access to the production of 
hermeneutical resources. Unlike journalists and legislators, they lack a platform from which 
to spread ideas through the population. Cleaning is also a vocation that commands less 
respect from the public at large than, say, law, and this lack of respect means that people are 
generally less inclined to listen to what cleaners may have to say. Second, members of certain 
social groups find it easier to enter those careers that afford greater hermeneutical power. 
White males from affluent backgrounds tend to dominate those professions with greater 
access to the production of hermeneutical resources. Social groups with inferior access to the 
production of shared meanings are 'hermeneutically marginalized'. This does not mean that no 
members of those groups will enter those professions. Some will make it despite the odds. 
But this does not erase their hermeneutical marginalization. Indeed, this is likely to show up 
in the hermeneutical resources. The fact that they are from a marginalized group means that 
they will be anomalous amongst their professional peers. Their experience will be unusual in 
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certain respects for members of their profession. As such, they may find it difficult to institute 
meanings to capture their experience, despite their relative hermeneutical power. 
Fricker holds that where a culture's shared meanings fail to properly capture the 
experiences of a social group, and where that group is one with a relative lack of access to the 
production of hermeneutical resources (i.e., where that group is hermeneutically 
marginalized), then members of that group who are negatively affected by the lack of shared 
meanings are victims of hermeneutical injustice. 
 
Two initial problems 
The central problem I want to raise for FrickerÕs account is that it relies on two conflicting 
intuitions about the source of hermeneutical injustice that cannot be reconciled. To anticipate, 
one is the intuition that what matters to hermeneutical injustice is the uneven distribution of 
hermeneutical power. The second is the intuition that what matters to hermeneutical injustice 
is the nature of the hermeneutical resources. Certain ideas should (and others should not) be 
included in the cultural lexicon. I will say more about these claims in due course. FrickerÕs 
reliance on these two intuitions means that her account is both too restrictive and too 
permissive. My strategy will be to first present a series of cases where FrickerÕs account gives 
us the wrong result, before showing that this is due to the conflicting intuitions at its heart. 
I will begin by showing that her account is too restrictive and cannot accommodate 
all the cases that we intuitively think should count as instances of hermeneutical injustice. In 
particular, it fails to explain one of her paradigmatic examples: Joe. We certainly feel that he 
is wronged by peopleÕs failure to take his stalking experiences seriously, and so Fricker is 
right that the gap in the hermeneutical resources that prevents him from successfully 
communicating to Clarissa and the police is an injustice. But recall that a harmful lack of 
meanings only constitutes an injustice if the person harmed is hermeneutically marginalized. 
If the latter condition does not hold, the case is one of bad luck Ð like the person suffering 
from the mystery illness Ð rather than an instance of hermeneutical injustice. Fricker rightly 
holds that hermeneutical marginalization is not an all or nothing affair Ð there are degrees to 
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which people face obstacles to hermeneutical participation. She intends JoeÕs case to lie at the 
limits of what can be considered hermeneutical marginalization. Indeed, it does not fit the 
picture sketched above. He is a successful science journalist, and thus employed in a 
profession that wields a large amount of hermeneutical power. Moreover, insofar as he is a 
white male, he is typical of groups that find it easier to enter his profession. Fricker 
correspondingly describes his situation as being an ÔincidentalÕ case of hermeneutical 
injustice, in contrast to the ÔsystematicÕ cases of Sanford, Wood, and White. 
 But in what sense is Joe hermeneutically marginalized? FrickerÕs text offers two 
different ways to understand this. First, she writes that Ôsystematic cases [are those where] the 
hermeneutical marginalization entails marginalization of a socio-economic sortÕ (Fricker 
2008: 155). Correspondingly, incidental cases are those where the hermeneutical 
marginalization does not go hand-in-hand with socio-economic marginalization. One might 
understand this as the distinction between cases where someone is marginalized by factors 
that form part of a widespread pattern of social exclusion, versus cases where someone is 
marginalized by the isolated actions of an individual or small group of individuals. In line 
with this, we can understand Joe to be hermeneutically marginalized by the isolated actions of 
Clarissa and the police officers to whom Joe appeals for help, where their marginalizing 
actions do not form part of a larger societal pattern. 
 There are various difficulties with this suggestion. For one thing, I am skeptical that 
the isolated acts of an individual (or small group of individuals) can properly be said to 
constitute marginalization, even if those acts are wrong, and occur on more than occasion Ð 
as they do in JoeÕs case. But setting this aside, how do Clarissa and the police marginalize Joe 
on FrickerÕs analysis? She tells us that he is hermeneutically marginalized insofar as Ô[t]he 
competing and trivializing interpretations coming from Clarissa and the police respectively 
mean that JoeÕs hermeneutical participation is hindered in respect of [his stalking 
experiences]Õ (Fricker 2008: 158). In other words, JoeÕs hermeneutical marginalization 
consists in the fact that he cannot properly communicate his stalking experiences to Clarissa 
and the police. However, the hermeneutical injustice he suffers is also supposed to consist in 
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the fact that he cannot properly communicate these experiences to Clarissa and the police. 
The supposed marginalization just collapses into the supposed injustice on this view. But 
according to FrickerÕs account, for a harmful lack of meanings to constitute a hermeneutical 
injustice, rather than mere bad luck, it must result from hermeneutical marginalization, and 
this requires the injustice and the marginalization to be distinct.  
One might object at this point that there is more to the case. Joe is unable to 
communicate his stalking experiences to Clarissa and the police because of prevailing ideas 
about masculinity Ð only women are stalked; itÕs unmanly to be scared of stalkers; this is not 
something that happens to real men; etc. Thus one might contend that Joe is hermeneutically 
marginalized by the presence of these ideas, or at least, Clarissa and the policeÕs use of them 
in interpreting his experiences. However, the claim that Joe is prevented from communicating 
his experience because the hermeneutical resources contain inappropriate ideas is just the 
claim that the appropriate meanings are lacking. Again, JoeÕs marginalization collapses into 
the supposed injustice Ð a harmful gap in the hermeneutical resources Ð and so Joe cannot be 
said to suffer from hermeneutical injustice. 
A second way that we might try to understand the case of Joe is suggested by the 
following remark: ÔThe complexity of social identity means that hermeneutical 
marginalization afflicts individuals in a differentiated manner; that is, it may afflict them qua 
one social type, but not anotherÕ (Fricker 2008: 154). FrickerÕs remark encompasses two 
slightly different facts about social identity and hermeneutical participation. First, it points to 
the fact that if we want to accurately describe the amount of hermeneutical power enjoyed by 
a particular individual and, correspondingly, the extent to which that person faces obstacles to 
hermeneutical participation, we need to individuate social groups finely. For example, some 
white males are hermeneutically privileged, but many are not Ð those from working-class 
backgrounds face barriers to entering hermeneutically powerful professions. Rather than 
simply talking about white males, we need to talk about white males with a particular gender 
identity, a particular class background, a particular sexual orientation, and so on. Different 
social groups enjoy differing amounts of hermeneutical power relative to one another, so as 
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noted above, hermeneutical marginalization can be Ômore or less persistent and wide-rangingÕ 
(Fricker 2008: 153). For example, the Ôsecond-waveÕ feminist movement was criticized for 
predominantly reflecting the concerns of white, middle-class women. Whilst such people 
were hermeneutically marginalized in that they wielded less hermeneutical power than their 
male counterparts, they enjoyed greater hermeneutical participation than black women, whose 
lives were not adequately described by the hermeneutical resources the movement produced. 
Consequently, where an individual is from a group that enjoys some hermeneutical power, but 
is less powerful than other groups in the culture, much of their experience will be captured by 
the cultureÕs resources, but there may still be some areas that are obscured. Where such an 
individual is harmed by the lack of meanings, we may describe this as an incidental case of 
hermeneutical injustice.  
Whilst this is a satisfactory understanding of incidental cases in general (or at least 
one sort of incidental case), it does not help with the particular case of Joe Ð as a heterosexual, 
middle-class, cis-gendered, etc. white male, he is from a group that enjoys the greatest 
amount of hermeneutical power in our culture. 
The second fact indicated by FrickerÕs remark is that people enjoy different amounts 
of hermeneutical power in different contexts:  
 
[A woman who] has a well-paid job in a large corporation with a macho work ethic [É] may 
be entirely unable to frame meanings, even to herself, relating to the need for family-friendly 
working conditions (such sentiments can only signal a lack of professionalism, a failure of 
ambition, a half-hearted commitment to the job), and yet she may be in a hermeneutically 
luxurious position as regards her ability to make sense of other, less gendered areas of her 
work experience (Fricker 2008: 154). 
 
Thus someone who is generally hermeneutically powerful might, in particular contexts, face 
obstacles to participation. If this results in a harmful lack of meanings, they will be a victim 
of incidental hermeneutical injustice. We might think that this provides a way to understand 
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the case of Joe. One could argue that women Ð at least a certain subset of them Ð are treated 
as authoritative with respect to stalking. Whilst Joe generally enjoys a considerable amount of 
hermeneutical power, he faces obstacles to participating in the cultural discourse surrounding 
stalking because he does not belong to this subset of women. He is therefore marginalized in 
this context. As a result, our ideas about stalking adequately capture the experience of the 
women who are treated as authoritative, but they are a poor fit for Joe, who is subsequently 
harmed. We can thus take Joe to be a victim of hermeneutical injustice. 
However, whilst this picture provides a good general conception of (one type of) 
incidental hermeneutical injustice, it does not stand up to further scrutiny as an analysis of 
JoeÕs case. Notice first that the claim that (some subset of) women are treated as authoritative 
with respect to stalking so that the meanings available properly capture their experiences is 
highly questionable. Organisations supporting female victims of stalking consistently report 
that the legislation and support available to them is inadequate, often dangerously so (Fletcher 
and Richards 2012). Kamir (2001) argues further that anti-stalking laws address cultural 
stereotypes of stalkers, rather than actual flesh-and-blood stalkers and their victims. Now 
consider JoeÕs situation. What exactly are the obstacles that Joe faces to participating in the 
cultural discourse about stalking? He is a science journalist, so not someone who would be 
typically asked to contribute articles about stalking. Nevertheless, it is plausible to suppose 
that his role provides him with some sort of platform. He will be in contact with other 
journalists, editors, TV producers, etc. who decide what sorts of issues will be covered in the 
media. If he was working in the current day and age, he would Ð no doubt Ð have Facebook 
and Twitter accounts, a personal blog, a webpage, and all the other virtual trappings of 
modern life, providing him with further means of reaching the public. As such, Joe is surely 
well-placed to take part in the cultural discourse about stalking; he does not face obstacles to 
hermeneutical participation on this issue. Instead, what seems to be the case is that what Joe 
says about stalking must be in keeping with the cultural ideas about it. Since his experiences 
fall outside the dominant cultural narrative(s), he cannot properly communicate them to 
others. But now we are back at the first, problematic suggestion. Under the current proposal, 
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JoeÕs hermeneutical marginalization consists in the fact that he is prevented from 
communicating his stalking experiences due to conflicting cultural ideas surrounding 
masculinity. JoeÕs problem is simply that he lacks the meanings he requires, and so the 
supposed marginalization simply collapses into the supposed injustice. 
Fricker could, at this point, simply bite the bullet, and accept that whilst Joe is clearly 
harmed by his inability to properly communicate his experience, he is not a victim of 
hermeneutical injustice. After all, Joe is only included as a marginal case, and one might 
suppose it makes no real difference to her framework if the line between hermeneutic bad 
luck and injustice is drawn a little differently. But it is not clear that this is a good option. We 
certainly feel that Joe is not merely harmed, but wronged. Furthermore, there are other similar 
cases that elicit this intuition, perhaps even more strongly. Consider male victims of domestic 
violence, and male victims of rape. Whilst women suffer in greater numbers from both of 
these crimes, there are a number of men who also suffer. Our cultural ideas about rape and 
domestic violence mean that they face significant obstacles to communicating their 
experiences to others and are significantly harmed as a result. Intuitively, such men are 
wronged by the current hermeneutical situation. But like Joe, the problems they face in 
communicating their experiences boil down to cultural ideas about masculinity. Thus, they 
cannot be classed as hermeneutically marginalized, and therefore cannot be said to suffer 
from hermeneutical injustice on FrickerÕs account. This is extremely counterintuitive.   
The next problem for Fricker is what whilst her analysis is, in some respects, too 
restrictive, and fails to accommodate the case of Joe and others like it, it is also too 
permissive: it lets through cases that we do not intuitively think are examples of 
hermeneutical injustice. I will consider two such cases. 
The first counterexample is based on remarks made by Cooper (2004). She notes a 
common problem with accounts of oppression: it is difficult to provide criteria that pick out 
all and only those groups that we intuitively take to be oppressed. This difficulty is illustrated 
by the way that groups we would not ordinarily take to be oppressed present their situation 
using the language of oppression. One such group is the UK pro-hunting lobby. The pro-
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hunting lobby was formed in reaction to the UK governmentÕs decision to legislate against 
fox-hunting Ð a traditional UK blood-sport. The hunt consists in a group of horse-riders 
accompanied by a pack of dogs, who pursue a fox until it is exhausted and collapses, at which 
point, the dog pack rips it apart. In 2005, the then Labour government decided there was no 
place in UK life for what they saw as a barbaric practice, which was subsequently outlawed. 
As Cooper (2004) points out, in the period preceding this decision, the pro-hunting lobby 
presented themselves as an oppressed minority. What is particularly interesting for our 
discussion here is that, although they did not employ the concept, the pro-hunting lobby 
claimed (amongst other things) to be victims of hermeneutical injustice. They argued that fox-
hunting is part of the countryside way of life, which constitutes a minority culture that the 
city-dwelling government and its supporters had not experienced and did not understand. 
Whereas the majority of the UK populace interpreted fox-hunting as barbaric, they saw it as 
an ancient rite, steeped in tradition, that was important in bringing together different sections 
of the countryside population who all participated in the hunt in different ways. They claimed, 
in other words, that the shared hermeneutical resources lacked the meanings required to 
properly understand this aspect of country life, leaving them unable to communicate their 
experiences to the majority culture. Moreover, the pro-hunting lobby claimed to be 
significantly harmed by this lack of meanings insofar as it resulted in what they saw as a 
legislative attack on countryside culture. 
Of course, hermeneutical injustice requires hermeneutical marginalization. Since it is 
primarily white, relatively wealthy people who engage in fox-hunting (May 2013), and since 
these people enjoy greater access to careers that afford greater hermeneutical power, this 
crucial ingredient is missing. However, the arguments used by the pro-hunting lobby to 
justify fox-hunting can also be used to justify other traditional British blood-sports, such as 
badger-baiting and dog-fighting, which have both been illegal in the UK for far longer. Like 
fox-hunting, these activities have a long history, and play a role in community cohesion, 
bringing people together to enjoy the spectacle. Unlike fox-hunting, however, those who 
partake are typically from a group that is hermeneutically marginalized: white working-class 
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males (see, e.g., Holt (1990)). They face obstacles to entering professions such as law, 
journalism, etc. The general view of badger-baiting and dog-fighting as barbaric causes harm 
to those who participate, since they must engage in these sports in secret, and risk arrest, 
fines, and imprisonment for doing so. The shared hermeneutical resources lack the meanings 
required for participants in these activities to describe them as a legitimate and traditional 
pastime, and they are harmed as a result. One must thus conclude that badger-baiters and dog-
fighters are victims of hermeneutical injustice. But this is deeply counterintuitive.  
The second case concerns the English Defence League (EDL), a group that was set 
up in the UK in 2009. It presents itself as a human rights organisation created to defend 
ÔEnglish CultureÕ against what it sees as the encroachment of Islam, which it associates with 
Ôthe denigration and oppression of women, the molestation of young children, the committing 
of so-called honour killings, homophobia, anti-Semitism, and continued support for terrorist 
activitiesÕ (EDL website). The EDL contends that Ôsharia is already creeping into our livesÕ 
citing the availability of Halal meat as one example (ibid.). It further claims that Ôthe British 
political and media establishment have, for a long time, been presenting a very sanitised and 
therefore inaccurate view of IslamÉ [in so doing], the Government has effectively been 
acting as the propaganda arm of the Muslim brotherhoodÕ (ibid.). The EDLÕs self-description 
incorporates a view of the surrounding world (England being taken over by an oppressive 
force in the form of Islam, with the tacit support of the UK authorities), a view of their own 
activities (justified actions against Islam, carried out for the good of England), and a 
conception of the groupÕs identity (a human rights organisation). 
The majority of the British public do not share these views. Whilst the UK mediaÕs 
portrayal of Islam is generally problematic (see Saeed (2007) for one analysis), the British 
public Ð which, of course, includes some Muslims (around 5% of the population according to 
the 2011 Government census) Ð does not generally accept the EDLÕs view of Islam and its 
encroachment into British life. The EDLÕs activities are seen as violent and harmful 
disturbances, rather than justified measures taken for the wider good. They are not seen as a 
legitimate human rights organisation. They are instead viewed as a violent street protest 
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movement. Moreover, their situation bears certain parallels to the cases Fricker identifies as 
paradigmatic instances of hermeneutical injustice. Like the EDL, Carmita Wood has a view 
of the world that the culture at large fails to accept Ð she views the professorÕs behaviour 
towards her as problematic, but the culture at large sees it as harmless flirting. Similarly, 
neither the EDL nor Carmita Wood nor Edmund White can justify their behaviour (actions 
against Islam, leaving work, and homosexual activity, respectively) to others. EDL membersÕ 
conceptions of their own identity, qua EDL members, is rejected by the culture at large in 
much the same way that Edmund WhiteÕs is. The UKÕs hermeneutical resources thus lack the 
shared meanings the EDL requires to communicate its view of the world to others, justify its 
actions and establish its identity as a legitimate human rights organisation. Furthermore, EDL 
members are harmed as a result. Their activities are policed; their street protests are broken up 
and met with counter protests from anti-Fascist groups that sometimes turn violent (although 
it is not entirely clear this is experienced as a harm by EDL members, since many of them 
openly embrace violent encounter); the group is a subject of derision in the mainstream 
media. 
The members of the EDL form a minority group Ð in 2011, the think tank Demos 
estimated their active members to number around 25,000 Ð 35,000 (Bartless and Littler 2011). 
The EDL recruits largely from existing football hooligan networks (Garland and Treadwell 
2010). In the UK, these tend to be composed almost exclusively of young, white, working-
class males (Frosdick and Marsh 2005), (Spaaij 2006). Further evidence confirming the 
demographic make-up of the EDL comes from a Guardian analysis of its donors Ð Ô68% live 
in local authorities where unemployment is above the national median, and 23% live in a 
region whose jobless rate is amongst the worst 10% in England and WalesÕ (Burn-Murdoch 
2013). As I have already noted above, young, white, working-class males face significant 
obstacles to entering professions such as law, journalism, politics, and so on. This group is 
thus hermeneutically marginalized. Since EDL members form a sub-section of this group, 
they are likewise hermeneutically marginalized. It follows that the EDL suffer from 
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hermeneutical injustice qua EDL members, according to FrickerÕs analysis. This is a deeply 
counterintuitive result. 
One may try to respond to the above counterexamples by distinguishing between a 
case where a culture lacks the meanings an individual needs to capture her experience (due to 
that individualÕs hermeneutical marginalization), and a case where the meanings exist in the 
shared hermeneutical resources, but the dominant cultural group(s) reject a description of an 
individualÕs experience in those terms. One may then contend that it is only cases of the 
former sort that should be classed as hermeneutical injustice. Since the EDL and blood-sports 
enthusiasts are of the latter type (the relevant meanings are amongst the cultureÕs shared 
resources, itÕs just that a description of experience in those terms is rejected by dominant 
group(s) within the culture), these are not instances of hermeneutical injustice. However, this 
response is inadequate. For one thing, it may not be possible to decide in some cases whether 
the relevant meanings are lacking, or whether they are present but rejected by dominant 
cultural groups. Consider Edmund White. One could say that the required meanings are 
lacking because the dominant view of homosexual activity is that it is perverse and evidence 
of mental illness. On the other hand, one could say that the shared hermeneutical resources 
contain the idea of healthy, normal sexual activity, and so Edmund White does not lack the 
appropriate meanings to describe his sexuality; rather, the dominant group(s) reject his 
description.  
Even if it were possible to clearly distinguish between cases of the former and latter 
sorts, there is a problem with supposing that only the former have any call to be classed as 
hermeneutical injustice. Imagine, for example, a culture where women are hermeneutically 
marginalized Ð perhaps US culture during Wendy SanfordÕs time. The medical establishment 
Ð and culture at large Ð briefly recognise postnatal depression as a medical condition. 
However, a group of doctors are sceptical, and manage to convince their peers and the wider 
culture that postnatal depression is a myth, and mothers should be blamed for feelings of 
hopelessness, irritability, lack of love for their babies, etc. The meanings such women require 
to accurately capture their experience will be part of the shared hermeneutical resources Ð the 
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notion of postnatal depression is now part of the cultural lexicon Ð itÕs just that the dominant 
group(s) within the culture reject a description of their experiences in these terms. Yet, these 
women will be harmed as a result in exactly the same ways as Wendy Sanford is harmed. The 
fact that the shared cultural resources contain the required meanings in the former case, but 
are lacking in the case of Wendy Sanford seems neither here nor there. There is thus no good 
reason for holding that Sanford suffers from hermeneutical injustice, whilst the women in the 
imagined situation do not. It follows that Fricker cannot dismiss the cases of blood-sports 
enthusiasts and the EDL on the grounds that the meanings they require are not lacking, but 
simply rejected by the dominant cultural group(s). 
 
The underlying difficulty 
FrickerÕs account faces two problems: it is both too restrictive, failing to accommodate cases 
we think it should; and too permissive, classing as hermeneutical injustices, some cases we 
think it should not. In this final section, I will give a diagnosis of the situation and consider 
whether Fricker can respond.  
The difficulties are generated by two underlying intuitions that are in tension. The 
first is central to FrickerÕs account. It holds that what matters to hermeneutical injustice is the 
uneven distribution of hermeneutical power. It is wrong for a more dominant social group to 
impose their meanings onto a less powerful group who are subsequently harmed. This 
intuition is silent with respect to the content of the meanings at stake. The second is exploited 
by the problem cases. It holds that what matters to hermeneutical injustice is the nature of the 
hermeneutical resources. Certain ideas should (and others should not) be included in the 
cultural lexicon. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when someone is harmed due to a lack of 
meanings that should be included, irrespective of considerations to do with the distribution of 
power. Thus the distribution of hermeneutical power is skewed against the EDL and the 
blood-sports enthusiasts, but we are reluctant to class them as victims of hermeneutical 
injustice because we do not feel the meanings they require to properly capture their 
experiences should be included in the cultural lexicon. Conversely, Joe suffers no lack of 
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hermeneutical power, but we feel the meanings he requires are ones that should be included in 
the cultural lexicon. Since he is harmed by this omission, we feel that he is a victim of 
hermeneutical injustice.
1
 I take the problem created by the tension between these two 
intuitions to go well beyond the specific counterexamples I have offered here.   
Initially, we might suppose FrickerÕs account can be revised to incorporate both 
intuitions. The first way of doing this is to simply add a third condition to FrickerÕs existing 
analysis, specifying that the meanings the agent lacks must be those that should be included in 
the cultural lexicon. On this revised understanding, hermeneutical injustice consists in: harm 
done to an agent through a lack of appropriate meanings to capture her experiences, where 
those ideas should be included in the hermeneutical resources, and where the agent is 
hermeneutically marginalized. This revision allows one to rule out the EDL and the blood-
sports cases since the meanings they require should not included in the cultural lexicon. 
However, it also rules out cases like Joe, because he is not hermeneutically marginalized. As I 
argued above, the case of Joe is relevantly similar to the situations faced by male victims of 
rape and domestic violence. We feel that these people are wronged by the lack of available 
meanings, which prevents them from communicating their experiences and accessing the 
necessary support. A notion of hermeneutical injustice that cannot capture these cases is thus 
deeply unsatisfactory.  
 The second option is to split FrickerÕs notion of hermeneutical injustice into two 
separate types of injustice, which may or may not accompany each other:  
(i) Injustice that consists in harm caused by a lack of meanings that should be included 
in the hermeneutical resources. 
(ii) Injustice that consists in what Fricker calls hermeneutical marginalization, where one 
faces social obstacles to gaining hermeneutical power. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!
1
 Fricker seems to want to incorporate both of these intuitions. But as should be clear from the 
discussion here, her account as it stands does not, and as I will show below, itÕs not at all clear that it 
can be revised to do so. 
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On this proposal, Sanford, Wood and White suffer both forms of injustice. Joe is subject to 
(i), but not (ii) as he is not hermeneutically marginalized. The EDL and the blood-sports 
enthusiasts are subject to (ii) but not (i), since the meanings they require to communicate their 
experiences should not be included in the hermeneutical resources.  
 Whilst this at first seems a satisfactory way of accommodating our intuitions about 
the cases we have considered, this option creates problems for Fricker. It is unclear how (i) 
can be defended as a form of injustice when divorced from (ii) in the way suggested. She 
argues that in some cases Ð such as the person suffering from a mystery illness Ð an agent 
may lack the meanings required to successfully capture their experience, but this will be a 
matter of bad luck. The harm an agent suffers due to a lack of appropriate meanings will only 
constitute an injustice if she is hermeneutically marginalized. Thus if (i) is divorced from (ii) 
in the way suggested, then it is no longer possible to distinguish between cases of 
hermeneutical bad luck and real instances of injustice type (ii). One might try to argue that we 
have intuitions about which harms count as bad luck and which count as injustice, and this is 
sufficient to distinguish between the two. However, I suspect that our intuitions are not very 
clear-cut on this issue and so there will be some cases we cannot decide in this way. Far more 
importantly, I take it that an account of injustice should aim to provide theoretical support for, 
or a theoretical analysis of, our intuitions about the matters in hand. (This may include 
showing why some intuitions are misplaced or should be disregarded.) Whilst it is true that 
for some cases we have intuitions concerning whether an agent suffers bad luck or injustice, a 
theory that incorporates these intuitions should offer some analysis of the difference between 
these two cases (or show why, contrary to intuition, there is no difference). The modified 
version of FrickerÕs analysis we are considering offers no such support. In its absence, (i) 
cannot be maintained as a form of injustice. This is very unsatisfactory as it does not allow us 
to retain cases like Joe. 
 FrickerÕs account cannot be satisfactorily revised to accommodate both the intuition 
that hermeneutical injustice is a matter of unevenly distributed hermeneutical power, and the 
intuition that it is harm brought about by a lack of meanings that should be included in the 
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cultural lexicon. The preceding discussion makes clear that we have good reasons to preserve 
both intuitions, but now I want to examine this more closely. Could we give one of them up? 
 Consider the second intuition that hermeneutical injustice occurs because meanings 
that should be in the cultural lexicon are lacking. Jettisoning it means biting the bullet when it 
comes to the problem cases and accepting that the EDL and blood-sports enthusiasts are 
victims of hermeneutical injustice, but that Joe Ð along with male victims of rape or domestic 
abuse Ð is not. There is a certain amount of support that can be mustered for this strategy. The 
discussion up until now has proceeded as if there is general agreement concerning which 
cases should be classed as instances of hermeneutical injustice. Given that such judgements 
are apparently based on intuitions about which meanings should be included in the cultural 
lexicon, the discussion has assumed general agreement over the latter too. But, of course, 
there is no such agreement. Members of the EDL and the blood-sports enthusiasts precisely 
disagree with the range of meanings I think our cultural lexicon should include. In making 
judgements about what does and does not count as injustice, based on intuitions about which 
meanings should and should not be included in the cultural lexicon, I am doing so as a person 
from a particular social group that wields a certain amount of hermeneutical power. Insofar as 
I am an academic, appealing to the intuitions of other academics, my position is one of 
relatively greater hermeneutical power. Thus in denying that the EDL and the blood-sports 
enthusiasts are victims of hermeneutical injustice, I am simply enacting an instance of such 
injustice against them. To avoid this unpalatable situation, we should therefore accept that 
they are victims of hermeneutical injustice, in the face of intuitions to the contrary. 
 However, whilst there is something to this line of thought, the consequences are so 
unpalatable that it should be resisted. Accepting that a situation is unjust implies that one 
should work towards Ð or at the very least, endorse activities towards Ð remedying the 
injustice. It follows that if one accepts that the EDL suffer hermeneutical injustice, one is 
required to work towards (or endorse initiatives towards) changing the cultural lexicon to 
include their anti-Islamic meanings. The same goes for those in favour of blood-sports. I do 
not think that this can be accepted.  
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 The response just given effectively re-asserts the second intuition that some meanings 
should (and others should not) be included in the cultural lexicon, and hermeneutical injustice 
only occurs when someone is harmed due to a lack of meanings that should be included. The 
intuition is that there is an objective way to assess meanings, i.e., a way to decide whether or 
not a given idea should be included in the cultural lexicon that is not relative to a particular 
world-view. Should we prioritize this intuition? The foregoing discussion has given us some 
reasons to do so, but things are not that simple. We have already seen that this idea on its own 
cannot yield an account of hermeneutical injustice because it offers no way to distinguish 
between hermeneutical wrong and bad luck. It also requires us to identify criteria to decide 
which meanings should be included/omitted from the cultural lexicon, which are both 
independent from a particular world-view, and yield plausible results in the context of 
hermeneutical injustice. ItÕs not clear that this can be done. 
One might suppose that we can appeal to truth and/or harm to rule out certain ideas. 
But consider truth. PeopleÕs ideas about the world are not all straightforwardly descriptions of 
an independent reality that correspond or fail to correspond to it. Some ideas concern social 
reality, and many aspects of social reality are constructed by those ideas. There can, of 
course, be truths about socially constructed things. If I believe that the British currency is the 
dollar, I am wrong, even though money is socially constructed. However, it does mean that 
where a group thinks of something that is socially constructed in a way that is different from 
the dominant understanding of that thing, it is not clear that the correct response is simply to 
rule out their view on the grounds that it is false. Think about Edmund White. If it is the case, 
as many thinkers have argued, that the criteria for what counts as mental illness make 
irreducible reference to cultural norms, then there is no culture-independent way of deciding 
what counts as a mental illness (see, e.g., Wakefield (1992)). There are still facts about what 
counts as mental illness, but these are in some sense up to us. When gay people in the 1950Õs 
tried to alter the dominant understanding of homosexuality as a mental illness, their 
alternative narrative was false, given the way that the facts had been constructed. Yet we do 
not consider the falsity of their view an acceptable reason to rule it out. Analogous points can 
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be made about some aspects of the EDL case. Of course, some of the EDLÕs claims are 
straightforwardly false Ð for example, their conception of the threat posed by British Muslims 
is just wrong. But suppose we attribute to them, the more moderate position they sometimes 
espouse Ð they simply want to preserve the English way of life from the culturally alien 
influence of Islam Ð and consider their claim to be a human rights organization in that 
context. Human rights organisations do not exist in the world independently from the way 
that humans think about things. They are socially constructed. According to our current 
understanding of such matters, it is false that the EDL are a human rights organization. But 
given that what counts as such is up to us, it is unsatisfactory to rule out their self-conception 
on these grounds. I suspect that since many putative instances of hermeneutical injustice will 
concern socially constructed phenomena, truth will not be a very useful criterion for deciding 
which meanings should (not) be included in the cultural lexicon. 
An alternative is to use harm to decide whether or not an idea should be in the 
cultural lexicon. Given that our common nature as human beings means that we require, 
broadly speaking, the same things to flourish, it seems that an objective conception of harm, 
i.e., one that is not culturally relative, is available. (An analogous conception of harm that 
applies to non-human creatures can likewise be formulated, based on what they require to 
flourish.) One might suppose that this is sufficient to rule out the EDL and the blood-sports 
cases, since they meanings they require to communicate their experiences are objectively 
harmful to Muslims, and to badgers and dogs, respectively. Those ideas should therefore be 
omitted from the cultural lexicon, and so the EDL and blood-sports enthusiasts are not 
victims of hermeneutical injustice in virtue of this lack. However, there are two significant 
problems with this suggestion. 
First, whether or not something is harmful does not settle the question of whether or 
not it is, overall, a bad thing because harms have to be weighed against benefits. Cars, for 
example, are objectively harmful. Several people, not to mention numerous creatures, are 
killed or injured by cars each year, and the production and running of automobiles greatly 
contributes to the pollution of the planet. Similarly, many, many animals are objectively 
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harmed every day by being killed for food. Yet we do not see fit to abandon either cars or 
meat because we think that their benefits outweigh the harms. One might initially suppose 
that there is no big problem here since an account of what allows us to flourish, based on our 
common nature as human beings, will yield an objective conception of what is beneficial to 
us. Armed with these objective conceptions of harm and benefit, we can judge, independently 
from any particular world-view, whether the benefits outweigh the harms in any given case. 
However, whilst it is true that our common nature means that we need broadly the same 
things to flourish, there seems to be room for reasonable disagreement in a range of cases 
about the relative importance of different aspects of what benefits us, and how these should 
be weighed against various sorts of harm. It seems, for example, that people could reasonably 
disagree over whether car use should be heavily restricted, depending on the importance they 
assigned to the benefits of convenient travel versus the harms of automobiles. To say that 
there is room for reasonable disagreement is to say that there are different views on a matter, 
and no objective way to choose between them. It follows that whether or not something 
should be rejected or condemned as harmful will, for at least a range of cases, be something 
that can only be decided relative to a particular world-view, rather than something that can be 
objectively decided. There is no space here to set out criteria for what counts as a reasonable 
disagreement, but it is hopefully clear from these brief remarks that there is a substantial 
problem here for the view we are considering. Take the blood-sports case. It is clear that the 
meanings its enthusiasts require to capture their experiences are objectively harmful to 
badgers and dogs. It is also clear that belonging to a tightly knit community is objectively 
beneficial to us. Moreover, we can probably all agree that one way to bind a community is to 
preserve its traditions. The disagreement in this case concerns whether the harm done to 
badgers and dogs is outweighed by the benefits to the community brought about by 
preserving the traditions of dog-fighting and badger-baiting. The blood-sports enthusiasts 
hold that it is, whilst the wider culture holds that it is not. Perhaps this is a reasonable 
disagreement. If so, then the ideas of blood-sports enthusiasts cannot be ruled out using a 
purely objective conception of harm.   
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The second significant problem is that whilst some harms such as beheading are 
objective (i.e., they are harmful to anyone, irrespective of their world-view), other harms are 
culturally-relative. If we use culture-independent criteria to decide whether an idea is harmful 
and so should be excluded from the hermeneutical resources, we will exactly miss those ideas 
that are only harmful relative to a particular world-view. The problem is that at least some (I 
suspect, many) putative instances of hermeneutical injustice will be cases where the ideas of 
one social group are harmful relative to the world-view of another social group. Think, for 
example, about the clash between those social groups that support the French authoritiesÕ 
close regulation of hijab-wearing, and the Muslim women who favour unrestricted veiling. 
Wearing a hijab (or not) is neither objectively beneficial nor objectively harmful. It only 
carries significance relative to particular world-views. It follows that a culture-independent 
means of identifying harmful ideas is completely unable to adjudicate in the French hijab 
case. 
The difficulties with finding some objective way to assess meanings Ð and the 
realisation that truth and harm (the obvious candidates) in the realm of social reality are, in 
many cases, culturally relative Ð pushes us back towards the first intuition that we should 
think of hermeneutical injustice as consisting in the uneven distribution of hermeneutical 
power. But as we have already seen, there are serious problems with this claim.  
  
Conclusion 
Fricker (2008) offers an account of a form of injustice wherein a dominant group imposes its 
meanings onto those of a less dominant group, who is harmed as a result. She calls this 
Ôhermeneutical injusticeÕ. I have argued here that her account fails to capture all the cases she 
wishes (rightly) to include as examples of hermeneutical injustice, and it is open to serious 
counterexample. These cases present a serious challenge to her view. They reveal that we 
have two strong intuitions about the source of hermeneutical injustice that are in tension with 
one another. There are good reasons for accepting both, but each also brings with it serious 
difficulties. Unsurprisingly, they cannot be made consistent within FrickerÕs framework. I can 
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see no way to overcome the problem, which unfortunately, leaves FrickerÕs account in a 
difficult position. 
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